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INTRODUCTION 
Steve Subrin is the chronicler par excellence of the American procedural 
past. His histories of the Field Code and the origins of the Federal Rules of Civ-
il Procedure know no equal.1 The extent to which Prof. Subrin’s work occupies 
the field would be frustrating to an aspiring historian of American civil proce-
dure, were he not such a uniquely kind and generous colleague. I will not, how-
ever, dwell on Prof. Subrin’s unmatched achievements as a legal historian in 
my contribution to this festschrift celebrating his career.2 Rather, I mention this 
scholarship to support a claim. If those who know history best understand the 
present, then Prof. Subrin is a particularly good interpreter of American civil 
procedure’s current era. 
I wish it were otherwise because Prof. Subrin has surveyed our procedural 
present and does not like what he sees.3 Since the 1970s, changes to the Ameri-
can procedural system have “eviscerated the core values of the Federal Rules, 
namely simplicity, uniformity, access to courts, decisions on the merits, and at-
torney latitude.”4 According to Prof. Subrin’s critique, today’s procedural doc-
trine fails to vindicate claims accurately and reliably, denies litigants opportuni-
ties to participate, and undermines core duties and commitments of our three 
branches of government.5 
To Prof. Subrin, one of the current era’s worst developments is the disap-
pearance of the civil trial, a phenomenon he has lamented with passion for dec-
ades.6 The civil trial’s demise should cause alarm for many reasons, Prof. 
Subrin believes, but chiefly for the harm it inflicts on American democracy.7 
When juries decide cases, elites lose their stranglehold on legal power and citi-
                                                        
1  Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The Disciplined Cham-
pion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 115 (Peninah R.Y. Petruck 
ed., 1991); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analy-
sis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988); Stephen N. Subrin, 
Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery 
Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common 
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 
(1987). 
2  My own historical work reflects his influence. See, e.g., David Marcus, The Past, Present, 
and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 387–
90 (2010) (citing Subrin’s work). 
3  See generally Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil 
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014). 
4  Id. at 1856. 
5  Id. at 1887–90. 
6  Id. at 1875–77; Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a 
Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 95 (1997) 
[hereinafter Subrin, Uniformity]. 
7  Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realis-
tic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 401 (2011) (arguing that “[i]f one be-
lieves in the underlying values of American democracy” that the disappearance of the civil 
jury trial is “deeply troubling”). 
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zens gain entry to a unique forum for civic education.8 These benefits disappear 
with the trial’s decline, leaving behind an impoverished procedural system. 
Prof. Subrin believes that “[c]ivil litigation and democracy should be, and 
they can be, mutually reinforcing.”9 If this is so, then procedural designers 
should identify ways to resurrect the civil trial. Prof. Subrin has done his part, 
suggesting a set of reforms devised to boost the rate at which small-scale pri-
vate law cases go to trial. I describe and briefly critique his proposal in part I. I 
question whether the sort of interventions Prof. Subrin has proposed will send 
enough civil cases to trial to achieve the sort of goals he rightfully champions. 
Still, Prof. Subrin has made a compelling case that procedural doctrine 
should shoulder a democratic agenda, and that the civil trial can further this 
agenda well. I thus extend Prof. Subrin’s search for the civil trial’s future and, 
with it, the democratic contributions that civil procedure can make to other cor-
ners of litigation. At the opposite end of the procedural spectrum from Prof. 
Subrin’s small-scale private law affairs are large structural reform lawsuits. I 
argue in part III that these cases may be the best place to look for trial and its 
benefits going forward. Structural reform trials can facilitate pro-democratic 
judicial review, create uniquely important moments of accountability for gov-
ernment officials, and spur political engagement outside the courtroom. These 
cases will always remain a small part of the American civil docket, but their 
subject matter has such public significance that trials in them can particularly 
affect the workings of representative government. Moreover, while the overall 
civil trial rate may be hard to budge, a modest change to judicial practice may 
produce more trial-type proceedings in structural reform cases. I draw inspira-
tion for these claims from a case study I provide in part II, where the heart of 
this article lies. Graves v. Arpaio, a class action challenging conditions in jails 
run by Arizona’s notorious Sheriff Joe Arpaio, went to trial in August 2008. Its 
labyrinthine history illuminates the democratic rewards that trials in structural 
reform cases can produce. 
Prof. Subrin celebrates the anti-elitist and civic engagement benefits of jury 
trials, goods that bench trials in structural reform cases cannot generate. In fact, 
these cases often highlight some of the phenomena, including enhanced judicial 
power, that Prof. Subrin faults as anti-democratic when they surface in smaller 
cases. It may be time, though, to remember the civil trial in modest cases as a 
procedural relic of a bygone era. If so, structural reform litigation may prove 
the most fertile ground for this distinctive process, and, going forward, struc-
tural reform trials may make different but nonetheless important contributions 
to American democracy. 
                                                        
8  Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Se-
lective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 36 (1994) [hereinafter Subrin, 
Fudge Points]. 
9  Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 402. 
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I. THE DISAPPEARING CIVIL TRIAL AND PROF. SUBRIN’S RESPONSE 
Prof. Subrin believes that our procedural system, if properly designed, can 
improve American government by “adding legitimacy and stability to govern-
ment and society,” “permitting citizens to partake in governance,” “restraining 
or enhancing power,” and “enhancing human dignity.”10 Of all the system’s 
constituent processes, the civil trial can serve these goals with distinctive suc-
cess. Its efficacy results chiefly from juror participation. Jury trials temper elite 
control of legal processes and offer intense moments for civic education. In 
Prof. Subrin’s words, these trials “add legitimacy to our process by engaging a 
wider spectrum of the population”; they “counter-balance” the power judges 
wield “by providing community input and permitting dialogue between many 
citizens”; they educate citizen-jurors “in the values of democracy, law, and 
governance”; they introduce citizens to others in their community with whom 
they might otherwise lack contact;11 and they give “the citizenry at large” the 
power to “decide[] what the community deems acceptable” as “legitimate be-
havioral norms.”12 
If the civil trial can deliver all of these benefits, then its near-disappearance 
should cause worry.13 This demise has attracted much comment and only needs 
a brief summary here. In 1962, trial verdicts accounted for 11.5 percent of all 
civil case dispositions.14 By 1982, this figure had fallen to 6.1 percent.15 As of 
the turn of the century, only about 2 percent of civil cases ended with a trial 
verdict,16 and the American civil litigator averages under one trial per year.17 
Prof. Subrin believes that this demise partly results from litigation ineffi-
ciencies fueled by the Federal Rules’ needless procedural burdens and com-
plexity. The Federal Rules do not stop a lawyer from using scorched-earth liti-
                                                        
10  Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure, 7 
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139, 140 (1999). The complete list includes the following: 
(1) resolving and ending disputes peacefully; (2) efficiency; (3) fulfilling societal norms through 
law-application; (4) accurate ascertainment of facts; (5) predictability; (6) enhancing human dig-
nity; (7) adding legitimacy and stability to government and society; (8) permitting citizens to 
partake in governance; (9) aiding the growth and improvement of law; (10) restraining or en-
hancing power. 
Id. 
11  STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE 
IN CONTEXT 256–57 (2006); see also Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 402. For similar 
sentiments, see ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 113–33 (2009); Rob-
ert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential Effect of the Van-
ishing Trial on America’s Social Capital, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 165 (2006); Paul D. Carring-
ton, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79 (2003). 
12  Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 402. 
13  SUBRIN & WOO, supra note 11, at 240–41. 
14  Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462 (2004). 
15  Id. 
16  Id. at 463. 
17  ABA SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: FULL REPORT 19 (Dec. 11, 
2009). 
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gation tactics to bludgeon adversaries into settlements.18 Indeed, the Federal 
Rules force even parsimonious lawyers into activity, such as mandatory disclo-
sure, that generates costs but often does little to improve the accuracy of case 
outcomes.19 As a result, as Prof. Subrin lamented decades ago, the Federal 
Rules have turned “[p]artners, associates, paralegals, secretaries, office manag-
ers, experts, photocopying machines, magnetic tapes and computers” into “pla-
toons poised to attack, defend and counterattack.”20 Parties feel compelled to 
settle, and judges exert more control in an effort to contain excessive litigation. 
This case management, enabled by the “unbridled discretionary power” the 
Federal Rules afford judges,21 can “exacerbate the disease” by increasing litiga-
tion activity, and thus costs, even further.22 Judges push the parties to settle,23 
and they contort dismissal and summary judgment doctrine to expand their 
power to dispose of cases before trial.24 
For as long as Prof. Subrin has complained of trial-killing tendencies in the 
Federal Rules, he has dreamt of a solution.25 Rather than have a single set of 
rules apply regardless of case size, a tailored set of procedures should govern 
“simple track” cases, a category of mostly common law disputes involving less 
than $500,000 in controversy.26 A recent iteration of Prof. Subrin’s proposal 
describes the following procedures: 
A simple track would set a trial date shortly after commencement that is perhaps 
no more than six or nine months from the date the answer is filed. A discovery 
cut-off date would be set at the same time. There would be only one required 
conference, to set the discovery-cut-off date and the firm trial date, and perhaps 
even this could be dispensed with if presumptive time standards were estab-
lished. There would be limits on discovery for all cases on the simple track. 
Whether that would be two or three depositions, each one lasting no more than 
three or four hours, and ten or fifteen interrogatories, would be up to the drafters 
[of the simple track rules]. The length of time before trials and discovery cut-off 
dates should also be left to the drafters, but it is important that once the dates and 
limitations are decided upon, they be kept firm, except for very good cause 
                                                        
18  Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjust-
ing the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 387 (2010) [hereinafter 
Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure]. 
19  Id. at 389. 
20  Stephen N. Subrin, The Law and the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1979, at 23. 
21  Subrin, Fudge Points, supra note 8, at 36. 
22  Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 389. 
23  Subrin, Uniformity, supra note 6, at 94. 
24  Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 390. 
25  “Dreamt” is an apt word. Stephen N. Subrin, Reflections on the Twin Dreams of Simpli-
fied Procedure and Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 173, 182 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Subrin, Reflections] (describing “simplified procedure” as a “dream”). 
26  Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 398–400; Burbank 
& Subrin, supra note 7, at 409–11. Subrin would exempt cases involving “the private en-
forcement of public law,” or those brought to vindicate statutory rights of action, from his 
proposal. Id. at 411. Hence, the impact would be confined to common law disputes. 
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shown. . . . The drafters of the simple track should consider requiring more spec-
ificity for document requests than is currently the norm . . . .27 
In addition, a notice pleading standard would govern complaints for cases 
on the simple track, and the “simple track” rules would exempt parties from ini-
tial disclosures requirements.28 
As intended, these “simple track” procedures would reduce litigation inef-
ficiencies by restricting discovery and decreasing the work associated with 
mandatory pretrial conferences. Focused on the merits by the early trial date, 
litigators would eschew tangentially important discovery and marginally useful 
motion practice.29 The “simple track” procedures would protect against the 
buildup of settlement pressure that litigation inefficiencies produce. Judges 
would have less to manage, both because the “simple track” procedures would 
require less stewardship, and because the discovery restrictions would mini-
mize conflicts requiring a referee. Freed from having to deal with discovery 
disputes and other tedious housekeeping matters, judges would be less tempted 
by “trial-aborting procedural devices,” such as summary judgment and Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissals.30 Trial would become “an economically realistic option in 
substantially more cases.”31 Trials would again enable civil litigation to rein-
force democracy.32 
Several recurring themes emerge from Prof. Subrin’s evaluation of the jury 
trial’s benefits, his diagnosis of what has caused its decline, and his prescription 
of simple track procedures as a remedy. Juror empowerment expands civil pro-
cedure’s democratic potential. Inefficiency generated by wasteful, unhelpful 
litigation has decreased the trial rate and denudes the contributions procedure 
can make to representative government. Judicial power, manifested as exten-
sive case management and the enlarged exercise of decisional authority, results 
from this inefficiency and exemplifies the anti-democratic turn in the American 
procedural system. Significant, but not transformative, rule changes can boost 
the rate at which small-scale cases go to trial and thereby help civil procedure 
reclaim some of its lost capacity to contribute to American democracy. 
If this summary of Prof. Subrin’s work is accurate, then my suggestion that 
one look for democratic benefits in structural reform trials might seem to mis-
fire. These cases rarely empower jurors as decisionmakers33 and instead vest 
                                                        
27  Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 399. 
28  Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 409–11. 
29  Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 399. Cf. Subrin, 
Uniformity, supra note 6, at 96 (discussing the utility of an early trial date in producing liti-
gation efficiencies). 
30  Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 413; see also Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive 
Procedure, supra note 18, at 404. 
31  Burbank & Subrin, supra note 7, at 414. 
32  Id. 
33  For an example of a judge empaneling an advisory jury in a significant injunctive relief 
case, see NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396–97 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). For a 
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judicial elites with a sizeable endowment of both decisional authority and man-
agerial discretion. Moreover, structural reform cases are “statistical rarities.”34 
Even if all went to trial, the overall civil trial rate would hardly budge. 
Nonetheless, for a couple of reasons, a search in big cases for the future of 
trial as a pro-democratic process makes sense. First, Prof. Subrin’s proposal, if 
implemented, might not work. As Steven Gensler and Judge Lee Rosenthal ob-
serve, “[t]he vast majority of cases are going to settle for reasons that are not 
tied to how the judge conducts the pretrial process.”35 Empirical data on attor-
ney behavior are consistent with this observation. Most of the time lawyers 
keep litigation costs in check, even without rules requiring them to do so, and 
judges tend to be excessively absent from civil litigation, not overbearingly 
managerial.36 Lowering costs and minimizing judicial involvement through rule 
changes, in other words, may not change the civil trial’s status quo. In his most 
recent article, a magisterial study and critique of our current procedural era, 
Prof. Subrin identifies a range of political and cultural causes of the trial’s de-
mise.37 These forces are more likely culprits for the development Prof. Subrin 
regrets, and they probably exceed the capacity of procedural rule changes to 
counter. Second, even if Prof. Subrin’s simple track proposal could boost the 
civil trial rate, the result would be citizen jurors engaged exclusively with 
small-scale, private law matters. Few would ask jurors to decide issues of high 
political or policy salience. 
Large-scale structural reform cases against government defendants are 
small in number compared to the common law disputes Prof. Subrin targets 
with his simple track proposal. But a trial in even one of them might promise a 
good deal of democratic bang for the litigation buck, albeit of a different sort 
than what small jury trials can generate. I argue that this is so in part III. 
                                                                                                                                
discussion of the right to a jury trial in injunctive relief cases, see New York v. Beretta 
U.S.A. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
34  Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 
511 (1986). 
35  Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 849, 
867 (2013). 
36  EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL,  
CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 35, 42, 75 (2009), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf; see also Steve 
Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental 
Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 579 (2012) (“There is no evidence that discovery is an unreason-
able burden in the vast majority of cases. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary: discovery 
works well (or is not used at all) in most cases, and where used is commensurate to the 
stakes involved.”). Prof. Subrin acknowledges these data. Subrin, Limitations of Transsub-
stantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 392 (commenting on data that suggest that “lawyers 
. . . are effectively sorting cases on a case-size basis, despite the transsubstantive, equity-like 
nature of the Rules”); Subrin, Reflections, supra note 25, at 183 (“[I]t looks like lawyers are 
by themselves [and/or at the prodding of clients] making intelligent decisions about how 
much discovery is appropriate.”). 
37  Subrin & Main, supra note 3, at 1856–70. Cf. BURNS, supra note 11, at 88–108 (discuss-
ing suggested explanations). 
1530 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1523  
II. THE CIVIL TRIAL AND STRUCTURAL REFORM: THE MARICOPA COUNTY 
JAILS EXAMPLE 
My case study of Graves v. Arpaio, provided in this part, lays a foundation 
for my claims about American democracy and the structural reform trial. The 
case involves a constitutional challenge to the conditions of jails in Maricopa 
County, Arizona, institutions run by the infamous Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The 
plaintiffs, a class of pretrial detainees, established the defendants’ liability after 
what amounted to a bench trial in Autumn 2008, but not before nearly a decade 
of courtroom fights with an adversary famous for his stubborn refusal to com-
promise or cooperate. The story unfolds at some length, in part because I be-
lieve it is a good one, in part because the case itself has gone on for so long, 
and in part because it has a lot of relevant lessons to teach. The case’s history 
divides into three phases. The first lasted from 1977 to 1981. The second, a pe-
riod of gridlock, began in 1998 and continued for ten frustrating years. The 
third lasted for only a few months in 2008 before ending in trial. This final 
phase demonstrates the efficacy that aggressive case management and trial can 
have in the face of recalcitrant political power. 
A. The Maricopa County Jails and America’s Toughest Sheriff 
1. The Early History of Maricopa Jails Litigation 
Graves v. Arpaio began as Hart v. Hill in 1977, when lawyers for the Mar-
icopa County Legal Aid Society filed the initial complaint in the federal Dis-
trict of Arizona.38 Commenced during the heyday of prison reform litigation,39 
the case challenged a range of conditions. Among other allegations, the plain-
tiffs complained that officials running the Maricopa County jails had interfered 
with inmate mail, denied them use of telephones, forced them to listen to 
lengthy religious broadcasts over the public address system, failed to provide 
them access to legal materials, placed them in overcrowded and dirty cells, fed 
them inadequate food, and provided them inadequate medical care.40 
The case was assigned to Earl Carroll, who certified it as a class action.41 
After a couple of years of litigation, the parties agreed to enter into a consent 
decree toward the end of 1980.42 Judge Carroll held a fairness hearing in Feb-
ruary 1981 and issued a judgment incorporating the parties’ agreement a month 
                                                        
38  Complaint, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. June 16, 1977). 
39  MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 39 (2000). 
40  Complaint, supra note 38. 
41  Memorandum and Order at 5, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Aug. 
1, 1978). 
42  Stipulation and Agreement, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Dec. 8, 
1980). 
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later.43 The consent decree required a litany of changes to improve the lot of 
Maricopa County inmates, ranging from limits on inmate populations44 to im-
provements in food quality45 to better healthcare services.46 Read thirty years 
hence, some of the consent decree’s provisions stand out, given how flagrantly 
the county would renege upon them in the future. These include, for example, 
the county’s agreement “to provide detainees with heating and cooling systems 
. . . necessary to provide healthful and comfortable living conditions,”47 and its 
agreement “to provide a receiving screening of detainees prior to placement in 
the general population” to identify those needing medical care.48 
Judge Carroll retained jurisdiction to monitor compliance with the decree.49 
The rest of the 1980s witnessed some skirmishing over the county’s compli-
ance and the plaintiffs’ fees.50 By the end of the decade, filings amounted most-
ly to routine requests to override provisions of the consent decree for short pe-
riods of time or reports from the court-ordered monitor.51 In January 1995, 
Judge Carroll signed an amended judgment, replacing the 1981 consent decree. 
This amended judgment indicated that Judge Carroll would put an end to his 
monitoring of jail conditions, although he retained jurisdiction to enforce com-
pliance with the judgment’s specific terms.52 
2. Sheriff Joe and the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
The Maricopa County jails litigation took a fateful turn when Joe Arpaio, 
“America’s toughest sheriff,” arrived on the scene.53 He first won election to 
serve as Maricopa County’s sheriff in 1992, and voters have returned him to 
office five times since then.54 Arpaio has aggressively exploited nativist, anti-
big government resentment to achieve international notoriety.55 He received his 
first wave of national attention in 1993 when he erected a “tent city jail” in 
                                                        
43  Judgment, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 1981). 
44  Id. at 3. 
45  Id. at 18. 
46  Id. at 12–14. 
47  Id. at 6. 
48  Id. at 4. 
49  Id. at 2. 
50  Civil Docket at entries 215–374, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz.). 
51  Id. at entries 453–92. 
52  Amended Judgment at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 
1995). 
53  JOE ARPAIO & LEN SHERMAN, JOE’S LAW: AMERICA’S TOUGHEST SHERIFF TAKES ON 
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, DRUGS, AND EVERYTHING ELSE THAT THREATENS AMERICA (2008). 
54  Joe Hagan, The Long, Lawless Ride of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 2, 
2012); Joseph Serna, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Illegal Immigration Hardliner, Reelected, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2012. 
55  From early in his tenure, Arpaio made no secret of his dogged pursuit of publicity. See, 
e.g., Louis Sahagun, A Maverick Lays Down the Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1994, at A1 
(quoting Arpaio as criticizing his critics as “jealous” because “I’m getting all the publicity”); 
see also Hagan, supra note 54 (describing Arpaio’s love of publicity). 
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Phoenix, ostensibly to ease prison crowding,56 but also to cause inmates dis-
comfort.57 Temperatures in these tents during the long Phoenix summers have 
exceeded 140 degrees.58 
Other publicity-grabbing measures soon followed. Arpaio banned erotic 
magazines, cigarettes, and coffee;59 he refused to screen anything but G-rated 
movies for inmates;60 and, perhaps most notoriously, he required inmates to 
wear pink underwear.61 The tone Arpaio set hardly helped improve the condi-
tions covered by the 1981 consent decree.62 A 1996 U.S. Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) investigation discovered “routine abuse” of prisoners,63 and, after the 
death of an inmate, an Amnesty International report documented at least a doz-
en instances of the ill-treatment or use of excessive force on inmates.64 In 1997, 
a year when an Iceland judge refused to extradite a couple to Maricopa County 
on account of the jails’ “barbaric conditions,”65 a federal investigation ended 
when Arpaio agreed to end the use of excessive force on inmates.66 In 1999, he 
settled a lawsuit brought by the DOJ Civil Rights Division over allegations of 
constitutionally inadequate medical care for inmates.67 
During the first few years of Arpaio’s tenure, the Maricopa County jails 
remained subject to the 1995 amended judgment. On April 8, 1998, however, 
                                                        
56  Paul Leavitt, Weather Went to Extremes in July, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 1993, at 3A. 
Groups of five or more adults can schedule a tour of the “internationally famous Tents Jail.” 
Prospective tourists are advised that they must wear “business casual” attire.  
See MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF., Jail Information: Tent City Jail, 
http://www.mcso.org/jailinformation/tentcity.aspx (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
57  Touting his plan, Arpaio complained that “jails are too much like country clubs.” Leavitt, 
supra note 56. 
58  Eugene Scott, Temperatures Rise to 145 Inside Tent City, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 3, 2011, 
at B4. Asked to comment, Arpaio said, “[w]hat am I going to do, take them out of jail be-
cause it’s too hot?” Id. 
59  No-Frills Jail Gets Tougher: No More Coffee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1994, at 28. 
60  Judi Villa, Sheriff Bans R-Rated Movies for Jail Inmates, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 9, 1993, 
3:18 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/1993/12/09/19931209joe-arpaio-bans-
movies.html. 
61  State Plan to Stop Jail Underwear Theft Has Phoenix Sheriff Tickled Pink, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS (Sept. 21, 1995). 
62  One little but telling issue: notwithstanding the decree’s requirement that the county feed 
inmates adequately, Arpaio fed them green bologna. Sue Anne Pressley, Sheriff’s Specialty: 
Making Jail Miserable, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1997, at A01. 
63  Is This Man Amusing Anymore?, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,  
1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/28/magazine/sunday-july-28-1996-law-enforcement 
-is-this-man-amusing-anymore.html. 
64  AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ILL-TREATMENT OF INMATES IN MARICOPA 
COUNTY JAILS, ARIZONA 2 (1997), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a98520 
.html. 
65  Pressley, supra note 62. 
66  Dennis Wagner & Jerry Kammer, Arpaio Is Happy Jail Probe Is Over, ARIZ.  
REPUBLIC (Nov. 1, 1997, 12:10 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/1997/11/01 
/19971101joe-arpaio-jail-probe.html. 
67  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents at Exhibit A, Graves v. Arpaio, 
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2006). 
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Arpaio moved under the recently enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”) to terminate the consent decree.68 The Maricopa County jails litiga-
tion had never really ended, since Judge Carroll’s supervision remained ongo-
ing. Hence the District of Arizona clerk’s office sent Arpaio’s 2001 motion to 
Judge Carroll and Magistrate Judge Morton Sitver, who had worked with Judge 
Carroll during the litigation’s first phase in the 1970s. 
Enacted in 1995, the PLRA authorizes a defendant to move to terminate 
any “prospective relief” governing prison conditions, including relief obtained 
in litigation concluded before the statute’s enactment.69 Lawyers for the in-
mates challenged this provision of the PLRA as unconstitutional, and Judge 
Carroll agreed.70 But the Ninth Circuit reversed, and on September 25, 2001, 
Arpaio renewed his motion to terminate.71 
This date had enormous significance for the governance of Maricopa 
County jails. Although Judge Carroll initially denied the motion without preju-
dice pending an evidentiary hearing on jail conditions, the September 25, 2001 
filing triggered the PLRA’s automatic stay provision. The statute provides that 
a motion to terminate “shall operate as a stay” of a prison conditions remedy, 
beginning thirty days after filing and ending upon the entry of a final order de-
ciding the motion.72 In other words, although Judge Carroll had yet to decide 
whether the Maricopa County jails had improved sufficiently to justify an end 
to judicial supervision, the motion’s mere filing freed Arpaio’s jails from dec-
ades of federal control. So long as the motion to terminate remained pending, 
the plaintiffs could not enforce the amended judgment, regardless of how bad 
conditions got. 
B. Gridlock 
1. The Judiciary 
For the next six years, Graves v. Arpaio stalled, and the Maricopa County 
jails remained outside judicial supervision. The litigation sputtered along for a 
couple of years after 2001, with a smattering of motion practice but no real dis-
covery.73 Judge Carroll heard one day of testimony on November 25, 2003, and 
                                                        
68  Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4699770, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 
22, 2008). 
69  18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (2012); see also Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 
2000) (extensively discussing the termination provision). 
70  Graves, 2008 WL 4699770, at *1. 
71  Id. 
72  18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) (2012); see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349 (2000) (up-
holding as constitutional the automatic stay provision). 
73  None of the docket entries between September 25, 2001, and November 25, 2003, reflects 
any discovery. Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4699770, at *1–2 
(D. Ariz. Oct. 22, 2008). 
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another on January 22, 2004.74 The case then ground to a complete halt.75 In 
fact, the plaintiffs would complain in 2008 that “virtually nothing . . . [has] oc-
curred” since the January 2004 hearing day.76 (By point of comparison, Judge 
Carroll stewarded the first phase of litigation from filing to consent decree in 
less than four years.) 
Both the judges assigned to the case and the defense counsel bear responsi-
bility for this gridlock. Neither Judge Carroll nor Judge Sitver pushed the case 
along with any energy, a lassitude that the defense counsel exploited. By early 
2008, seven fully briefed motions awaited decision, including ones on matters 
as routine as a request for a status conference. Several of these motions had 
been pending for well over a year.77 In a couple of instances, the judges ex-
pressed some impatience with the plaintiffs. At one point, Judge Carroll point-
edly questioned the plaintiffs’ lawyers over the fees that they would seek if 
successful.78 Another episode went more to the case’s merits. On January 24, 
2005, an inmate with diabetes named Deborah Ann Braillard died after going 
seventy hours without insulin.79 Braillard had a lengthy arrest record, and she 
had received insulin during previous jail stints.80 This time, however, shoddy 
record-keeping practices kept jail staff in the dark about her diabetes during her 
intake.81 Braillard pleaded for help as her health deteriorated, and friends tried 
to notify the jail of her condition.82 But officers mistook her distress for symp-
                                                        
74  Graves, 2008 WL 4699770, at *2. The hearing testimony came from Arpaio’s witnesses. 
See Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW, at *9–12 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2005). 
75  On July 29, 2005, for example, plaintiffs listed the following undecided motions, among 
others: a motion for court-appointed experts (fully-briefed for eighteen months); a motion to 
compel defendants to allow expert inspections (fourteen months); a motion to quash deposi-
tion subpoenas (twelve months); a motion to compel the production of documents (twelve 
months); and a motion for leave to file declarations of class members (seven months). Pend-
ing Motions Notification Pursuant to D. Ariz. L. R. Civ. 7.2(I), Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-
cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. July 29, 2005). 
76  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Expedited Consideration of Motion for Appointment of Class 
Counsel and Motion for Expedited Consideration of All Pending Motions, at 2, Graves v. 
Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2008). 
77  Plaintiffs’ Fifth Pending Motions Notification, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-
NVW (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2008). 
78  Carroll was concerned about the hourly rate at which plaintiffs’ counsel would attempt to 
bill Maricopa County. As plaintiffs’ counsel pointed out several times, the court would have 
to approve any fees awarded prevailing counsel, and the PLRA caps the hourly rate afforded 
prevailing lawyers. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings, In-Court Hearing, Graves v. Ar-
paio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW, at *12–13, 19, 26 (D. Ariz. Jan. 24, 2008). 
79  Dave Biscobing & Mark LaMet, Key Evidence in Maricopa County Jail Death  
Suit of Deborah Braillard ‘Destroyed’, ABC 15 (Oct. 17, 2012,  
8:01 AM), http://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/key-evidence-in-mari 
copa-county-jail-death-suit-of-deborah-braillard-destroyed. 
80  JJ Hensley & Michelle Ye Hee Lee, County Agrees to Settle Suit Tied to Inmate Death, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 2012, at B4. 
81  Id. 
82  Biscobing & LaMet, supra note 79. 
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toms of withdrawal.83 At one point, they moved her to a television room so that 
she would not disturb sleeping inmates, then later dumped her unconscious 
body on her bunk.84 
For obvious reasons, class counsel wanted to talk to Braillard’s cellmates, 
who had witnessed the events leading to her death. Arpaio refused to allow the 
interviews, so the plaintiffs asked Judge Sitver to intervene. Although he ulti-
mately granted the motion to compel access, he did so with apparent reluctance. 
“The Court is well aware that continued attempts to seek the Court’s interven-
tion with respect to events occurring at the Maricopa County Jail . . . would not 
necessarily serve the interests of either the pretrial detainees or Defendants,” 
Judge Sitver wrote in February 2005. “Not every serious incident necessarily 
suggests a violation of constitutional rights . . . .”85 
2. The Defense Counsel 
The defense counsel stood to gain from delay, particularly because the 
PLRA required the consent decree’s suspension during the lawsuit’s pendency. 
From start to finish, Michele Iafrate, an erstwhile Maricopa County prosecutor 
with experience defending Arpaio’s office and other government units in abuse 
of power cases,86 represented the sheriff.87 Dennis Wilenchik joined Iafrate in 
October 2005, formally as counsel for the Maricopa County Board of Supervi-
sors (BOS), but effectively as another representative for Arpaio. The story of 
how he entered the case ultimately relates to some of the democratic benefits 
that trial in structural reform cases can create. 
The Maricopa County Attorney represents the BOS and determines whom 
to hire as outside counsel.88 In January 2005, Andrew Thomas, an Arpaio con-
                                                        
83  Hensley & Ye Hee Lee, supra note 80. 
84  Id. In November 2012, Maricopa County agreed to pay $3.25 million to settle the 
Braillard case, after seven years of litigation. Biscobing & LaMet, supra note 79. Arpaio’s 
office destroyed a number of pieces of key evidence that would otherwise have tended to 
demonstrate gross indifference to her health. Id. 
85  Order, at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2005). 
86  See IAFRATE & ASSOCS., Michele M. Iafrate, http://www.iafratelaw.com/staff/attorneys 
/michele-m-iafrate (last visited Apr. 23, 2015); IAFRATE & ASSOCS., Representative Clients, 
http://iafratelaw.com/representative-clients/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2015) (listing seven gov-
ernment units as “representative clients”). For representative cases, see Stoddard v. Do-
nahoe, 228 P.3d 144, 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010); Trombi v. Donahoe, 222 P.3d 284, 286 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Greenwood v. State, 175 P.3d 687, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
87  See Michele M. Iafrate, supra note 86. 
88  Bd. of Supervisors of Maricopa Cnty. v. Woodall, 586 P.2d 628, 632 (Ariz. 1978) (en 
banc). This power is actually contested and has been the subject of significant dispute. Opin-
ion and Order Imposing Sanctions, In re Members of the State Bar of Ariz., Andrew Thomas 
et al., PDJ-2011-9002, at 32–38 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012) [hereinafter “Thomas Disciplinary 
Opinion”], available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/9/Press%20Releases/2012 
/041012ThomasAubuchonAlexander_opinion.pdf. 
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fidante,89 began his tenure as county attorney.90 Thomas had worked the previ-
ous nine months as an associate at Wilenchik’s firm,91 a stint of employment 
the Ninth Circuit would later describe as “a disguised campaign contribution to 
Thomas.”92 Upon assuming office, Thomas frequently replaced government 
lawyers with outside counsel on civil cases.93 By October 2007, he had steered 
$1.8 million worth of this work to Wilenchik, his former employer.94 These 
matters included, for example, Thomas’s criminal investigation of Terry God-
dard, who had beaten Thomas in 2002 to win election as Arizona’s Attorney 
General.95 Wilenchik won Arpaio’s favor, and at one point Arpaio’s deputy re-
quested that Wilenchik represent the sheriff in all civil matters.96 
                                                        
89  Paul Rubin, Dangerous Mind, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, 
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2004-08-26/news/dangerous-mind/ (quoting Andrew 
Thomas as saying that “I have a good relationship with Joe”); Michael Kiefer & JJ Hensley, 
Criticism Mounting vs. Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Andrew Thomas, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 22, 2009, 
12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/12/22/20091222joe-arpaio-criti 
cism-mounting.html. Ultimately Andrew Thomas was disbarred as a result of some of his 
actions taken on Arpaio’s behalf. Thomas Disciplinary Opinion, supra note 88, at 232. The 
ethics opinion requiring this sanction said the following about Thomas’s relationship with 
Arpaio: 
[I]t was [Thomas and a colleague] who encouraged any untoward actions with a resolute refusal 
to act independently of the Sheriff. With either a wink and a nod or a collaborative voice they 
supported actions that became increasingly questionable, rather than independently following 
their seemingly never-assumed role as arbiters of justice. If the mighty forces of the offices of 
the Sheriff and the County Attorney in Maricopa County were adrift, they were intentionally 
loosed from their principled moorings by the guided hand of a Respondent with an intellect 
fueled with ferocity, an irrational ego and a concomitant endless ability to feed their actions with 
rumors and speculations. 
Id. at 21. 
90  John Dougherty, Doubting Thomas, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, June 13, 2006, 
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2006-06-08/news/doubting-thomas/. 
91  Id. 
92  Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 909 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
93  Head to Head: County Attorney’s Race, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Sept. 11, 2008, 10:39  
AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles/2008/09/11/20080911 
elex-ctyattyheadtohead.html. 
94  Sending Friend to Combat Foes: Thomas Funnels High-Profile Cases to Former Employ-
er, E. VALLEY TRIB., Oct. 23, 2007; see Dennis Welch, Thomas Uses Private Lawyers on 
Opponents, E. VALLEY TRIB. (Oct. 21, 2011, 7:52 PM), 
http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/news/article_4154bd07-accf-570b-ade3-0dc550aac1ee.html; 
see also Lacey, 693 F.3d at 941 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting in part). 
95  Welch, supra note 94. 
96  Paul Rubin, Below the Belt, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Sept. 20, 2007), 
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-09-20/news/below-the-belt/ (reporting the contents 
of a letter from Arpaio’s top deputy to Thomas, in which the deputy requests that Thomas 
hire Wilenchik to represent the sheriff’s office in all civil matters); see also John Dougherty, 
Bully Pulpit, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (June 29, 2006), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com 
/2006-06-29/news/bully-pulpit/ (discussing the same letter). 
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Wilenchik has won attention for aggressive litigation tactics deployed in a 
couple of instances.97 An example involves a proceeding against the Phoenix 
New Times, an alternative weekly and long-time Arpaio adversary. (The events 
eventually generated a civil suit filed by the newspaper’s editors, and the fol-
lowing story is based on allegations in the complaint and not facts proven at tri-
al.98) The newspaper published Arpaio’s home address on its website in 2004, 
in connection with a story about alleged corruption in the sheriff’s office.99 Ar-
paio pressured Thomas to prosecute the newspaper, invoking an obscure Ari-
zona statute that prohibits the electronic dissemination of a law officer’s per-
sonal information.100 Eventually Thomas hired Wilenchik, along with a couple 
of other attorneys, to handle the matter as a special prosecutor.101 In October 
2007, Wilenchik served several grand jury subpoenas on the New Times, re-
questing, among other information, the names of all confidential sources used 
for stories about Arpaio and information about visitors to any story published 
on the newspaper’s website since 2004.102 The newspaper promptly published 
the subpoenas in an article entitled Breathtaking Abuse of the Constitution.103 
Wilenchik responded with a motion for criminal contempt, then had several of 
Arpaio’s men arrest the newspapers’ co-editors before the presiding judge 
could rule. The judge would soon quash the procedurally invalid subpoenas.104 
The editors sued, and, six years later, they settled their lawsuit against Arpaio, 
Wilenchik, and others for $3.75 million.105 
Public outcry forced Wilenchik off the Phoenix New Times matter, but oth-
erwise he continued to handle work on behalf of Maricopa County.106 Thomas 
has since met with a less desirable fate. He turned a disagreement with a couple 
of Maricopa County supervisors107 over outside counsel referral authority into a 
                                                        
97  Another illustration, in addition to what I discuss in this paragraph, is Wilenchik’s repre-
sentation of Arpaio in a defamation suit brought against Arpaio by one of his political oppo-
nents. See Dougherty, supra note 96. 
98  Lacey, 693 F.3d at 907. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 907–09. 
101  Thomas recused his office from the investigation on conflict of interest grounds. He was 
also a frequent target of Phoenix New Times muckraking. Id. at 909. 
102  Id. 
103  Michael Lacey & Jim Larkin, Breathtaking Abuse of the Constitution, PHOENIX NEW 
TIMES (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-10-18/news/breathtaking-a 
buse-of-the-constitution/full/. 
104  Lacey, 693 F.3d at 910. 
105  Michelle Ye Hee Lee & Michael Kiefer, Maricopa County Supervisors Settle Lawsuits 
Filed by ‘New Times’ Founders, Stapley, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 20, 2013,  
4:08 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20131218maricopa-county-super 
visors-settle-lawsuit-new-times-founders.html. 
106  Robert Anglen, Thomas Fires Prosecutor, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 20, 2007, 1:15  
PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2007/10/20/20071020joe-arpaio-new-times 
-case-dropped.html. 
107  The story leading to Andrew Thomas’s disbarment is a complicated one. As far as I can 
tell, the conflict between him and the Board of Supervisors began when he and one of the 
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bizarre vendetta against his political opponents.108 Among other misdeeds, 
Thomas indicted a supervisor on spurious bribery charges;109 filed a frivolous 
civil suit under the federal RICO statute, with himself and Joe Arpaio as plain-
tiffs, against a number of government officials, including four Arizona Superior 
Court judges;110 and then indicted a judge on fabricated bribery charges after 
the judge ruled against him and Arpaio several times.111 This misguided cru-
sade ended with Thomas’s disbarment and, as of December 2013, more than 
$17 million paid to settle civil cases brought by those wrongfully targeted.112 
3. A Strategy of Delay in Graves v. Arpaio 
Although not as newsworthy, the strategy of delay that Arpaio’s lawyers 
appear to have employed in Graves v. Arpaio was similarly aggressive. They 
repeatedly refused to engage in discovery,113 even ignoring the rare order is-
sued by Judge Carroll to cooperate.114 Filings proliferated, including those on 
picayune matters. After receiving a several-month extension to respond to a 
                                                                                                                                
supervisors had a disagreement about referral authority. Thomas Disciplinary Opinion, supra 
note 88, at 33–34. 
108  For much of the story, see Terry Carter, The Prosecutor on Trial: Ex-Maricopa County 
Attorney Faces Disbarment for Political Acts, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2012,  
11:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_prosecutor_on_trial_ex-mari 
copa_co._atty_faces_disbarment_for_political/. 
109  Thomas Disciplinary Opinion, supra note 88, at 67–68. 
110  Id. at 106. 
111  Id. at 142. Of the more than 1,000 licensed process servers in Maricopa County, Thomas 
chose a man who had been convicted years before of threatening the judge with bodily harm 
to serve him. Sarah Fenske, Joe Arpaio, Andrew Thomas and the Hunt for Gary Donahoe, 
PHOENIX NEW TIMES (June 3, 2010), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2010-06-03 
/news/the-hunt-for-gary-donahoe/. 
112  Ye Hee Lee & Kiefer, supra note 105. 
113  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, 
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2006) (describing defendants’ “blanket” refusal 
to provide documents in response to a discovery request); Defendants’ Maricopa County 
Board of Supervisor’s [sic] Objections to 9/30/05 Report and Recommendation and Motion 
for Protective Order and Request to Set Hearing/Oral Argument on Motion to Terminate at 
2–3, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2005) (objecting to order 
requiring defendants to produce various documents relating to inmate healthcare); Defend-
ants’ Motion for Emergency Hearing and Motion to Stay the September 30, 2005 Order and 
Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Magistrate Judge’s September 30, 2005 Order, 
No. 77-479, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 26, 2005) (same); 
Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Motion at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 
30, 2006) (moving to compel the defendants to participate in certain discovery and describ-
ing some of their discovery intransigence). To be fair to Arpaio, Judge Sitver left things in a 
confused state when he denied some of the plaintiffs’ discovery motions without prejudice 
and asked them to refile their motions together. Id. at 11–14. 
114  Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions for Defendants’ Failure to Comply With Discovery Or-
der at 1, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 2006). 
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discovery motion,115 for example, Arpaio’s lawyers opposed the plaintiffs’ re-
quest for several extra days to file a reply.116 More significantly, Arpaio’s law-
yers doggedly resisted when the appointed class counsel invited Margaret Win-
ter of the ACLU, one of the country’s premier prison conditions lawyers, and 
Osborn Maledon, a highly respected Arizona law firm, to join him on the plain-
tiffs’ side.117 Defense counsel’s objection generated ten filings,118 and for near-
ly two years the plaintiffs’ legal representation remained uncertain.119 
Judge Carroll abetted this gridlock-inducing strategy by simply not decid-
ing motions.120 The plaintiffs’ frustration was evident. “Defendants continue to 
do everything in their power to conceal evidence of current conditions at the 
Maricopa County Jail,” the plaintiffs bemoaned in December 2006.121 
Evidence of problems for inmates accumulated as the jails continued to op-
erate without federal judicial supervision due to the PLRA’s automatic stay 
provision. A corrections consultant hired by Maricopa County concluded in a 
2003 audit of the jails that prison healthcare failed to meet constitutional mini-
ma, and that the jails violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.122 From 2003 to 2007, Arpaio refused to file proof that his 
                                                        
115  Defendants’ Motion for Clarification and/or for an Extension of Time in Which to Re-
spond to Plaintiffs’ Omnibus Motion, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. 
June 1, 2006). 
116  Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Extension of Time to File Their Reply in 
Support of Their Omnibus Motion, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 15, 2006). 
117  Basically, Arpaio argued that the court had to appoint class counsel under Rule 23, and 
that the ACLU and the law firm could not sua sponte begin representing the class. Defend-
ants’ Objection to the Representation of the Plaintiff Class by the Osborn Maledon Law Firm 
at 3, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. June 1, 2006); Defendants’ Ob-
jection to the Representation of the Plaintiff Class by Margaret Winter, Graves v. Arpaio, 
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2007). He did not argue that either set of law-
yers was not competent to handle duties as class counsel. After Judge Carroll formally ap-
pointed the new lawyers (and thereby corrected the alleged error), Arpaio continued to ob-
ject, but on grounds that the appointment was not necessary given the complexity of the 
lawsuit. Defendants’ Motion to Reconsider Order Appointing Debra Hill and Margaret Win-
ter as Class Counsel, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 08, 2008). 
118  Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz.) (Civil Docket at entries 1146, 
1152, 1156, 1197, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1212, 1231). 
119  Judge Wake finally put an end to the opposition on April 17, 2008. Graves v. Arpaio, 
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW, at 1–2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2008). Arpaio had filed his first objec-
tion on June 1, 2006. Defendants’ Objection to the Representation of the Plaintiff Class by 
the Osborn Maledon Law Firm, supra note 117. 
120  See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Third Pending Motions Notification at 1–2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 
2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. July 30, 2007) (documenting seven fully-briefed motions that 
had been pending for more than 180 days). 
121  Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of: (1) Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Comply With 
Discovery Order and (2) Motion to Compel Supplemental Responses to First Request for 
Production of Documents, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 
2006). 
122  See John Dickerson, Inhumanity Has a Price, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Dec. 20, 2007), 
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-12-20/news/inhumanity-has-a-price/. 
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jails met national standards for adequate conditions with the Arizona Depart-
ment of Health Services, disobeying a state law that required otherwise.123 
Guards killed an inmate with mental disabilities in 2003; an incident that Ar-
paio tried to cover up by destroying evidence.124 In 2005, a pregnant prisoner 
received no medical care for days after another inmate attacked her. She lost 
her baby and nearly bled to death.125 That year, a Maricopa County superior 
court commissioner described the conditions faced by mentally ill inmates, up 
to 20 percent of the pretrial inmate population,126 in the following way: “Severe 
overcrowding, unsanitary conditions . . . and bullying by professional crimi-
nals, including assaults, extortion and stealing medications, are typical of the 
conditions under which the mentally ill live.”127 After trying for four years to 
make changes, a nationally recognized expert in prison healthcare hired by the 
county resigned in 2008, experiencing a “crisis of conscience” and worrying 
that he would lose his medical license over jail conditions.128 
The plaintiffs grew desperate. In January 2007, they requested that Judge 
Carroll designate another magistrate judge to handle discovery matters.129 Ar-
paio’s lawyers objected, arguing with some chutzpah that the “appoint[ment of] 
a new Judge to rule on certain matters may have the effect of delaying this 
case.”130 The plaintiffs’ Hail Mary came a year later. Noting that Arpaio had 
produced almost no discovery since January 2004, and listing the many pend-
ing motions, the plaintiffs moved to have the case transferred to Susan Bolton, 
a district judge who had just been assigned to an individual action challenging 
jail conditions.131 The request had no chance of succeeding. Judge Bolton’s 
                                                        
123  John Dickerson, Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s Jails Lose National Accreditation, PHOENIX NEW 
TIMES (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2008-10-09/news/sheriff-joe 
-arpaio-s-jails-lose-national-accreditation/. 
124  Melissa Gonzalo, Local Attorney Speaking Out Against Sheriff Arpaio, AZCENTRAL  
(Apr. 14, 2008, 6:30 PM) http://www.azcentral.com/12news/news/articles/2008/04/14 
/20080414mcsoallegations04142008-CR.html. 
125  John Dickerson, Arpaio’s Jail Staff Cost Ambrett Spencer Her Baby, and She’s Not the 
Only One, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Oct. 30, 2008), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com 
/2008-10-30/news/arpaio-s-jail-staff-cost-ambrett-spencer-her-baby-and-she-s-not-the-only-
one/full/. 
126  Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4699770, at *25 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 22, 2008). 
127  Christina Leonard, Detaining Mentally Ill in Jail a Problem, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar. 17, 
2005, 12:00 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/health/news/articles/0317mentallyill.html. 
128  Dave Biscobing & Mark LaMet, MCSO Jail Deaths, Lawsuits Considered ‘Cost  
of Doing Business’, ABC 15 ARIZONA (Sept. 12, 2012, 8:54  
PM), http://www.abc15.com/news/local-news/investigations/mcso-jail-deaths-lawsuits-con 
sidered-cost-of-doing-business. 
129  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Refer Discovery Matters to Magistrate Judge, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 
2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2007). 
130  Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Refer Matters to Magistrate Judge, Graves 
v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2007). 
131  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate Cases and Motion to Reassign Case, Graves v. Arpaio, 
No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2008). 
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lawsuit involved a pro se inmate plaintiff with an improperly filed complaint—
a case, in other words, wholly dwarfed by Graves v. Arpaio. She denied the 
motion in short order.132 
C. Trial Through Case Management 
Everything changed on April 3, 2008. Without warning or explanation, 
Judge Carroll issued a one-sentence order “recus[ing] himself from further par-
ticipation in” Graves v. Arpaio. A week later, the District of Arizona’s clerk’s 
office reassigned the case to Neil Wake.133 Judge Wake speedily untangled the 
farrago of filings. In six months, he presided over a tightly compressed discov-
ery period, held a bench trial, and issued an eighty-page order deciding the dec-
ade-old motion. 
A week after receiving the case, Judge Wake put a quick end to the long-
festering dispute over the ACLU’s and Osborn Maledon’s role as plaintiffs’ 
counsel.134 On April 24, he issued an extraordinary order, deciding all of the 
many pending motions in the case (except Arpaio’s motion to terminate) in one 
fell swoop.135 The order also clarified exactly what conditions Arpaio’s motion 
to terminate put at issue, a question of obvious importance but one that had 
gone unanswered for seven years. The PLRA provides that “[p]rospective relief 
shall not terminate if . . . prospective relief remains necessary to correct a cur-
rent and ongoing violation of the Federal right . . . .”136 The Ninth Circuit inter-
preted this language in 2000 to make “evidence on the current circumstances at 
the prison” essential to the disposition of a motion to terminate.137 Nonetheless, 
Arpaio’s lawyers had refused to respond to discovery requests, reasoning that 
their motion to terminate put only jail conditions on September 25, 2001, the 
moment of the motion’s renewal, at issue. All of the plaintiffs’ efforts to gather 
information about jail conditions since 2001, they insisted, were “meaningless 
and irrelevant.”138 Judge Wake rejected this implausible argument and kick-
started the long-dormant discovery on current jail conditions.139 
Most important, however, was the schedule Judge Wake set in his April 24 
order. Nothing but fruitless motion practice had proceeded since January 
                                                        
132  Hart v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 77-479; Popoca v. Arpaio, No. 07-2250 (D. 
Ariz. Apr. 9, 2008). 
133  Minute Order, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 10, 2008). 
134  Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-
NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2008). 
135  Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. entered Apr. 25, 2008). 
136  18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) (2012). 
137  Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000). 
138  Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Production of Documents at 5, 
Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Oct. 27, 2006). 
139  Order at 7, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. entered Apr. 25, 2008). 
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2004.140 Trying to get the case going, the plaintiffs asked that Judge Wake set a 
six-month discovery period, followed by a final evidentiary hearing on the mo-
tion to terminate. Not fast enough, Judge Wake decided. “The PLRA plainly 
conveys congressional intent that termination of prospective relief regarding 
prison conditions be decided swiftly,” he noted. Hence the evidentiary hear-
ing—for all intents and purposes, the trial—would begin in less than four 
months, on August 12, 2008.141 Wilenchik immediately moved for a continu-
ance,142 but Judge Wake refused. “The grave urgency of this proceeding re-
quires that all counsel take all efforts to meet the August 12, 2008 final hearing 
date,” he insisted, “as the dictates of Congress and the needs of justice in this 
case will not allow any delay.”143 
Judge Wake repeatedly reiterated his determination that the trial begin as 
planned. In an order setting a two-month discovery schedule that the early trial 
date necessitated, he declared that “[t]he deadlines established by this Order are 
real. ‘Best efforts’ alone will not constitute compliance.”144 Wilenchik resisted 
the trial plan. “I don’t mean to be disrespectful in any way,” he said at a May 
19, 2008, status conference, “but when you say we can’t wait, I guess my reac-
tion to that would be, we have waited [thirty] years.”145 “I’m not waiting [thir-
ty] years,” Judge Wake responded. “I’m not waiting four years. I’m not waiting 
four months.”146 Arpaio’s lawyers would have to tell their client that “this is the 
most important lawsuit” he has, the judge insisted, and that Arpaio’s people 
must do everything in their power to comply with authorized discovery.147 
“Whatever has happened in the past,” Judge Wake declared, 
I want diligent, prompt, and good faith production of this information. I don’t 
want—and I’m not making any comment or assertion or accusation by anybody. 
But I don’t want foot dragging. I don’t want combativeness. I want diligence and 
good faith exactly what Rule 1 and Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quire to get this information readily available and produced . . . .148 
                                                        
140  Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate and Motion to Transfer Consolidated Cases at 2–3, 
Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2008). 
141  Order at 9, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. entered Apr. 25, 2008). 
142  Defendant’s Motion to Continue, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. 
Apr. 30, 2008). 
143  Order at 1–2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 1, 2008). 
144  Order at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 29, 2008); see 
also Case Management Order at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. 
June 6, 2008) (stating “These Deadlines are Real,” and “The parties are warned that failure 
to meet any of the deadlines in this order or in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without 
substantial justification may result in sanctions, including dismissal of the action or entry of 
default.”). 
145  Transcript, Scheduling Conference at 22, at 2, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-
NVW (D. Ariz., May 19, 2008); see also id. at 5 (“I know sometimes the Court, with all due 
respect, gets involved in this quickly. It’s sitting there for 30 years, et cetera.”). 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at 39. 
148  Id. at 70. 
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After all, the judge continued, “the sheriff and the county have very large 
budgets for legal fees.”149 
The delaying tactics that Arpaio’s lawyers had previously employed 
stopped working, as an example illustrates. The plaintiffs wanted their psychi-
atric expert to interview a number of inmates during a tour of a jail. Arpaio’s 
lawyers objected, the parties took the matter to Judge Wake, and he granted the 
interview request.150 The interviews were scheduled for a Monday. The preced-
ing Thursday afternoon—more than three weeks after the judge issued his order 
but only a single weekday before the interviews were supposed to begin—
Iafrate informed the plaintiffs that Arpaio would not permit the interviews. By 
her recollection, she insisted, Judge Wake had actually denied the plaintiffs’ 
request.151 The plaintiffs moved to compel on Friday, taking the sort of action 
they had attempted to no effect previously.152 But Judge Wake ruled within 
hours, ordering before the weekend began that the interviews would proceed as 
planned on Monday.153 
A second episode also shows how Judge Wake’s case management practic-
es thwarted attempts to slow-walk the litigation. In June 2008, the parties 
clashed over the plaintiffs’ request to have two groups tour a jail simultaneous-
ly. The tours were supposed to begin on a Monday. At a hearing the preceding 
Thursday, Arpaio’s lawyer insisted that his client lacked sufficient lead-time to 
find personnel to act as tour guides.154 Judge Wake responded with a keen un-
derstanding of how delay served Arpaio’s interests: 
[F]irst of all, we have to remember the context of this motion and this case. This 
was your client’s motion filed 10 years ago, and it is, I believe, the oldest law-
suit, other than a few water cases, in the District of Arizona. This motion, which 
is 10 years old, is probably the oldest pending motion in this court. 
The matter is one of great importance to both sides. It is of great importance 
to the County and the sheriff to have it determine whether this injunction that 
they agreed to continues in effect. It’s of great importance to the plaintiff class to 
have the speedy determination of their motion, which, by statute, was supposed 
to have been decided 10 years ago. 
The result of the failure to decide this motion has been that the plaintiff 
class has been deprived of its stipulated injunction by virtue of the automatic 
stay in the PLRA. In effect, the defendants have gotten their relief without their 
motion having been found to be meritorious, and the plaintiffs have lost the ben-
efit of the injunction which they accepted in lieu of further adjudication. 
                                                        
149  Id. at 91. 
150  Id. at 116, 120. 
151  The argument on the issue at the status conference consumes fifteen transcript pages. Id. 
at 105–20. Moreover, Judge Wake actually ruled twice for the plaintiffs, once after Iafrate 
argued against the request and again after Wilenchik did the same. Id. at 105, 120. 
152  Plaintiffs’ Statement Regarding Discovery Dispute, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-
00479-NVW (D. Ariz. June 6, 2008). 
153  Order, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. June 6, 2008). 
154  Telephonic Discovery Dispute, Transcript at 4–5, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-
NVW (D. Ariz. June 19, 2008). 
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Now, I just give this brief summary, not to suggest how this case should go. 
I have no idea who will or ought to win this motion. But this is litigation of the 
utmost importance to all the parties and to the public. . . . And no matter how 
you analyze it, it appears to me that in light of all the resources available to the 
County and to the sheriff, and of all the emergencies that they have to deal with 
as a routine part of doing business, I can’t see any difficulty or any justification 
for not directing the sheriff and the County to provide whatever security or 
guides they think appropriate according to their standards and doing it even on 
four days notice . . . . 
So for these reasons, I find it not at all difficult to conclude that the County 
and the sheriff should be ordered, and I will order them, to provide the security 
they otherwise think appropriate for whether you call it two or three separate 
groups. 
And in so concluding, it appears to me, in fact, I have no difficulty conclud-
ing that any inconvenience to the County would be utterly trivial compared to 
the disruption to the case preparation, the discovery preparation, the needs of the 
litigants, and the needs of the Court to bring this long-delayed proceeding to a 
conclusion.155 
“My order is unqualified,” Judge Wake declared as he ended the hearing.156 
Judge Wake kept the parties to his schedule, and they completed extensive 
discovery in a very short period of time.157 The trial began on August 12, 2008, 
as planned, and proceeded for thirteen days.158 Shortly after it ended, the Na-
tional Commission on Correctional Health Care (“NCCHC”), a non-profit enti-
ty that reviews healthcare services for inmates, terminated its accreditation of 
the Maricopa County jails based on evidence introduced at trial.159 This devel-
opment dealt a blow to Arpaio, whose lawyers had stressed the NCCHC’s ac-
creditation to support the motion to terminate.160 
On October 22, 2008—ten-and-a-half years after Arpaio first filed his mo-
tion to terminate, but only six months and twelve days after Judge Wake got the 
case—the judge issued his findings of fact and conclusions of law. He conclud-
ed that some aspects of the amended judgment deserved termination, but also 
that the Maricopa County jails remained constitutionally deficient in a signifi-
                                                        
155  Id. at 6–9. 
156  Id. at 12. 
157  Between June 26, 2008, and July 30, 2008, for example, the parties noticed 54 deposi-
tions. Civil Docket at entries 1321–437, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. 
Ariz.). 
158  Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 4699770, at *1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 
22, 2008). 
159  Board Defendants’ Notice of Filing and Serving Affidavit of Betty J. Davis, Director, 
Correctional Health Services, Maricopa County, Arizona at Exhibit A, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 
2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2008) (attaching letter from NCCHC advising Ar-
paio that it was terminating its accreditation based in part on “trial testimony”). 
160  Arpaio’s post-trial brief mentions the NCCHC’s accreditation in the first paragraph of a 
section entitled “Evidence of Care.” Board Defendants’ Post-Hearing Brief at 17, Graves v. 
Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Sept. 10, 2008); see also Dickerson, supra note 
123 (describing the stress placed on the accreditation and trial and the reasons for its with-
drawal). 
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cant number of respects. He identified the following problems, among many 
others: 
x At one jail, pretrial inmates in segregated housing were locked into 
10.5 by 4.3 foot cells, three inmates per cell, for twenty-two to twenty-
three hours each day.161 
x Inmates spent up to eight hours in court-holding cells that lacked suffi-
cient “soap and toilet paper to maintain basic elements of hygiene and 
sanitation.”162 
x Intake cells, in which violent repeat offenders were indiscriminately 
mixed with DUI or criminal speeding arrestees, were “at times” so 
crowded that inmates could not sit down, even on the floor.163 Twenty-
four percent of inmates spent more than twenty-four hours in these 
cells upon arrest.164 
x Officers often failed to clean cells or provide inmates with adequate 
opportunities to do so themselves.165 
x Pretrial inmates were insufficiently screened for chronic health prob-
lems or mental illness, did not receive medications in a timely fashion, 
and were “frequently . . . denied” access to healthcare.166 
x The Maricopa County jails’ dietician’s opinion that inmates received 
adequate nutrition was “unworthy of belief.”167 Some of the food in-
mates received was inedible,168 and inmates lacked sufficient daily ca-
loric intake. 
x Corrections officers failed to monitor inmates sufficiently and did not 
maintain adequate security.169 
In 2010, the Ninth Circuit affirmed all aspects of Judge Wake’s decision.170 
As is invariably so with structural reform litigation,171 the story of Graves 
v. Arpaio did not end with the close of trial. The remedy phase, which began 
with the parties negotiating over proposed steps for reform,172 remains ongoing. 
After receiving several reports from monitors assessing his judgment’s imple-
mentation, Judge Wake expressed frustration in April 2010 with Arpaio’s fail-
ure to comply fully and especially that “improvements appearing to be most 
critically needed . . . appear to have been disregarded or postponed to avoid ex-
pense.”173 In some respects, however, the jails have clearly improved. By May 
                                                        
161  Graves, 2008 WL 4699770, at *15. 
162  Id. at *21. 
163  Id. at *17. 
164  Id. at *37. 
165  Id. at *22. 
166  Id. at *27–29. 
167  Id. at *45. 
168  Id. 
169  Id. at *48. 
170  Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2010). 
171  Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1979). 
172  See e.g., Joint Status Report With Respect to Medical and Mental Health Issues, Graves 
v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D, Ariz. Dec. 2, 2008). 
173  Order at 3, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 2010). 
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2012, lawyers for the plaintiffs agreed that Arpaio had remedied all of the non-
medical problems that Judge Wake had identified.174 Although some signs 
point in the right direction,175 the provision of adequate healthcare remains an 
ongoing concern.176 
III. THE ROLE OF TRIAL IN STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION 
Graves v. Arpaio required intensive case management by a federal judge at 
the apogee of his powers. Judge Wake had sole responsibility for decisionmak-
ing, no layperson participated in the establishment of minimal standards for 
prison governance, and the trial did not provide civic education to citizen-
jurors. Graves v. Arpaio is also an extraordinary case, hardly the sort of matter 
that could generate a large number of trials going forward. In other words, the 
case is the opposite of what Prof. Subrin targets with his simple-track proposal. 
But trials in big cases like Graves make important contributions to Ameri-
can democracy. An appreciation of these benefits requires that one rethink 
some of Prof. Subrin’s premises—that juror participation is key to procedure’s 
democratic potential and that judicial power denudes the contributions proce-
dure can make to representative government. Litigation inefficiencies might 
force settlement in small-scale cases, but in structural reform lawsuits they can 
preclude resolution on the merits. Coupled with aggressive case management, 
trial can respond and thereby act as a procedural facilitator for a type of litiga-
tion that addresses shortcomings in representative government. Trial also pro-
vides a unique moment of public accountability for various government offi-
cials and, because of some cases’ high political salience, a vehicle for political 
mobilization. Finally, these benefits might be realizable more readily than the 
sort that trial in small-scale cases might provide. A change to judicial practice 
can readily generate more trial-type proceedings in structural reform cases. 
What follows are a series of hypotheses, inspired by Graves v. Arpaio, 
about the function and value of trial in structural reform lawsuits. Although 
scholars have subjected this litigation to relentless scrutiny, little is known 
about the actual procedural dynamics of public law litigation or the incentives 
                                                        
174  Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant Arpaio’s Motion to Terminate, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 
2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 16, 2012). 
175  In 2011, the NCCHC conditionally restored the jails’ accreditation. Michelle Ye Hee 
Lee, Maricopa County Jails Receive Conditional Accreditation, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Dec. 14, 
2011, 9:44 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/12/14/20111214maricopa 
-county-jails-receive-conditional-accreditation.html. In March 2012, Maricopa County 
agreed to implement an electronic medical records system. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Medical 
Records in Maricopa County Jails to Go Electronic, REPUBLIC (Mar. 14, 2012, 9:35  
PM), http://archive.azcentral.com/12news/news/articles/20120314medical-records-maricopa 
-county-jails-go-electronic.html. Poor record-keeping had been a major cause of a number of 
problems, including Deborah Braillard’s death. 
176  Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1325–27 (D. Ariz. 2014). 
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motivating the participants in it.177 Part II’s case study of Graves v. Arpaio is 
fundamentally limited as a data source, but perhaps it suggests lessons that can 
inform an empirical research agenda going forward. 
A. Trial’s Relationship to Case Management in Structural Reform Litigation 
The democratic benefits that structural reform trials can produce flow in 
part from the functional utility of the process. Prof. Subrin faults aggressive 
case management in ordinary civil cases as a trial-killing phenomenon. If 
Graves v. Arpaio is representative, judicial power and trial enjoy a more sym-
biotic relationship in structural reform litigation. Trial, abetted by aggressive 
case management, responds elegantly to problems arising from the incentives 
that government officials and their lawyers may have to delay and obstruct. 
1. Delay and Obstruction as an Optimal Strategy 
Two types of inefficiencies in structural reform cases retard the resolution 
of cases on the merits, rather than force settlement. These inefficiencies pro-
duce delay and obstruction as the defendant’s preferred litigation strategy. The 
first has to do with informational difficulties. The parties may want to settle, 
but they cannot predict possible trial outcomes and thus cannot agree to settle-
ment terms. Recurring conditions in structural reform cases particularly thwart 
such prognostication, described by legal economists as essential to settle-
ment.178 As Judge Wake did in Graves, judges often bifurcate structural reform 
litigation into liability and remedy phases. The latter often last for a long 
time179—seven years and counting for Graves. Remedial phases often proceed 
as an exercise in dialogue and negotiation, not adversarial adjudication, as 
Graves has.180 The remedy depends not on some actuarial calculation of an in-
jury’s monetary worth, but upon the exercise of ample judicial discretion.181 
                                                        
177  Notable exceptions include Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A 
Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006), and Charles F. 
Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004). 
178  On the relationship between trial predictions and settlement, see, e.g., John H. Langbein, 
The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 564 (2012); Rich-
ard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 399, 417–18 (1973); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Dis-
putes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1984). 
179  Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 873–74 (1999) (“[S]tructural reform litigation takes place in a kind of slow motion, as 
rights and remedies are redefined in an iterated process that often stretches out over a num-
ber of years in an effort to achieve concrete changes in public institutions.”). 
180  Sabel & Simon, supra note 177, at 1055; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING 
GOVERNMENT 151 (1983); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1355, 1365 (1991). 
181  John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial Au-
thority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1128–34 (1996). 
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A principal-agent problem creates the second inefficiency. The government 
official calling the shots for the defendant agency might have an incentive to 
prolong litigation, even if settlement better serves the interests of the agency 
and the taxpayers paying for its defense. More litigation means more fees to 
distribute to outside counsel and thus to potential campaign donors. When An-
drew Thomas ran for reelection, for example, he received three-fourths of all 
contributions law firms handling Maricopa County work made to candidates for 
the county attorney position.182 Private litigants have an incentive to monitor 
wasteful litigation, since they will internalize the costs of excess by paying 
more in fees. When attorneys’ fees come from the public treasury, however, the 
costs are too diffuse to prompt such monitoring. An opponent might try to 
make political hay of these wasteful fees, but, if Maricopa County is any exam-
ple, they may have little resonance in elections marred by low voter turnout. 
Thomas tripled outside counsel fees during his first term as county attorney, for 
example,183 yet he easily won reelection. 
Also, a government official who settles a high-profile case may pay a polit-
ical price if the small number of motivated, ideological constituents who vote 
in minor elections interpret the deal as a sop to politically-disadvantaged 
groups.184 In fact, officials may believe they can curry political favor from such 
constituencies by refusing to compromise. Arpaio’s resistance to settlement 
overtures in a racial profiling case the DOJ brought against him suggests this 
sort of motive.185 “I am the constitutionally and legitimately elected sheriff and 
I absolutely refuse to surrender my responsibility to the federal government,” 
Arpaio fulminated. “[T]o the Obama administration, who is attempting to 
strong arm me into submission only for its political gain[,]” Arpaio continued, 
“I say, ‘This will not happen, not on my watch!’ ”186 
                                                        
182  Yvonne Wingett & Grayson Steinberg, Cash Pours In, Raising Stakes for County Attor-
ney Race, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 14, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com 
/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2008/08/14/20080814bigmoney0814.html. Control over the 
funds used to pay these fees was important enough in Maricopa County to start the series of 
missteps that led to Thomas’s disbarment. Other government officials might balk at wasted 
litigation costs and try to impose some discipline. See e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 177, 
at 1092. But recourse short of legal action against the profligate official might be limited. 
Only after Thomas’s fall from political grace did other officials within Maricopa County 
begin to discipline expenditures on private lawyers. Private Counsel Fees Are Capped, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, May 14, 2010. 
183  Private Counsel Fees Are Capped, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 14, 2010. 
184  For a more nuanced description of the incentives and pressures a government official 
feels, see Colin S. Diver, The Judge as a Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural 
Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 72–73 (1979). 
185  Sari Horwitz, Arizona Sheriff Rejects Court Monitor; Justice Department Threatens to 
Sue, WASH. POST. (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/arizona-sheriff 
-rejects-court-monitor-justice-department-threatens-to-sue/2012/04/03/gIQA8P8ztS_story.html. 
186  Jason Ryan, DOJ Breaks Off Negotiations With Defiant Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ABC NEWS 
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/doj-breaks-off-negotiations 
-with-defiant-sheriff-joe-arpaio/. 
Summer 2015] CIVIL TRIAL’S DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 1549 
Plenty of structural reform cases proceed amicably to negotiated resolu-
tions, without infection by these sorts of pathologies. But Graves v. Arpaio 
suggests that these inefficiencies can develop and produce a litigation dysfunc-
tion. Unable to predict outcomes, the government official does not want the 
agency to settle, but presumably he does not want it to lose at trial either. With 
plenty of fees to distribute, the official might opt for delay and obstruction as 
his preferred litigation strategy. The seven years of purposeless litigation in 
Graves v. Arpaio before Judge Wake assumed control testify to this strategy’s 
brutal effectiveness. 
2. Trial as a Response 
An early, firm trial date can defeat this dysfunctional strategy. Obstruction 
fails, because the trial forces a merits resolution in short order. The early, firm 
trial date can also solve the principal-agent problem created by the government 
official’s incentives to prolong litigation for two reasons. First, to the extent 
that the official fears a political backlash from a settlement, trial provides polit-
ical cover by taking the power to resolve the case out of his hands. Second, a 
firm trial date disciplines the official, who might otherwise pay wasteful fees as 
political patronage, and his counsel, who might otherwise pocket them happi-
ly.187 The reason is simple: “when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fort-
night, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.”188 To have a chance of winning, 
the government’s lawyers will have to allocate their scarce resources—their 
time and energy—efficiently and productively.189 They cannot pursue obstrep-
erous litigation conducted for purposes of delay, lest they begin trial unpre-
pared. 
Prof. Subrin has commented upon the effectiveness of an early trial date,190 
and Graves v. Arpaio illustrates its efficacy. Before the summer of 2008, al-
most no discovery proceeded, and when plaintiffs attempted to engage in dis-
covery, the defendants objected.191 Judge Wake set the trial date on April 24, 
2008. The plaintiffs then propounded a sizeable number of discovery requests, 
including dozens of deposition notices, and after Judge Wake rebuffed a couple 
                                                        
187  Cf. Stephen N. Subrin, Thoughts on Misjudging Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 513, 520 (2007) 
(“Without the realistic threat of trial, with the concomitant threat of imposed sanctions, not 
many defendants, if not most, would ever bargain at all.”). 
188  See Mortality Quotes, THE SAMUEL JOHNSON SOUND BITE PAGE, 
http://www.samueljohnson.com/mortalit.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
189  For a discussion of how early trial dates can contribute to the efficient prosecution of 
complex civil litigation, see Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging: The 9/11 Re-
sponders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 148–52, 172–73 (2012). 
190  Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 399; Subrin, Uni-
formity, supra note 6, at 96. 
191  E.g., Civil Docket at entries 958, 979, 1165, 1181, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-
NVW (D. Ariz.). 
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of attempts to delay discovery, the defendants cooperated with little re-
sistance.192 
The trial date’s firmness can require intensive case management by the 
court.193 Here is where the adversarial relationship between trial and case man-
agement that Prof. Subrin posits flips. If the defendants do not cooperate with 
the plaintiffs’ discovery requests, made on an expedited basis, the early trial 
date only harms the plaintiffs’ cause by leaving them with an impoverished ev-
identiary record. Judge Wake, for example, had to shepherd Graves v. Arpaio 
aggressively during the pretrial period. He issued a detailed scheduling order 
that prescribed dates for inspections, interrogatory responses, depositions, and 
the exchange of expert reports.194 He held a hearing every third weekday on 
discovery matters during the first month of the discovery period, and in the 
two-month period he decided nine discovery disputes overall.195 Prof. Subrin 
concedes the necessity of intense case management in complex litigation,196 but 
he treats this judicial role as something of a necessary evil. The judge qua case 
manager becomes an “efficiency expert[],” not an adjudicator, Prof. Subrin in-
sists, and thus “not what it meant to be a wise judge for the past three millenni-
um.”197 In structural reform litigation like Graves v. Arpaio, however, the judge 
qua case manager makes the judge qua adjudicator possible. 
B. The Democratic Benefits of Structural Reform Trials 
Connected to trial’s functional value in structural reform litigation is one of 
the contributions to democracy that such trials can make. By countering litiga-
tion inefficiencies, trials facilitate representation-reinforcing judicial review 
and thereby improve representative government. Structural reform trials do not 
derive their democratic force entirely from judicial power, however. They also 
provide a singular setting for government accountability, and their often high 
political salience can spur mobilization beyond the courtroom. 
1. Representation Reinforcement Benefits 
Lawyers often bring structural reform cases on behalf of politically mar-
ginalized groups, such as prisoners or children in foster care. These groups’ 
lack of effective representation in electoral politics may explain why the gov-
ernment treats them badly and why they need to sue. When a court remedies 
the group’s injuries with an injunction, it reinforces their representation, cor-
rects for a flaw in majoritarian institutions, and, so the argument goes, thereby 
                                                        
192  Id. at entries 1449, 1454. 
193  See Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 35, at 856. 
194  Order, Graves v. Arpaio, No. 2:77-cv-00479-NVW (D. Ariz. May 29, 2008). 
195  Id. (Civil Docket entries). 
196  Subrin, Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure, supra note 18, at 398; Subrin, Reflec-
tions, supra note 25, at 183. 
197  Subrin, Uniformity, supra note 6, at 100–01. 
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improves democratic government.198 Judicial review arguably vests judges with 
their most robust decisional power, but this power serves, rather than frustrates, 
democratic ends. 
Representation-reinforcing judicial review can only succeed if plaintiffs 
can put on a good case. Plaintiffs who attack the facial lawfulness of some stat-
ed policy may be able to do so without difficulty. Those who challenge the day-
to-day administration of a program, in contrast, may have a tougher row to hoe. 
These sorts of claims need extensive investigations into the daily operation of 
police stations, jails, public schools, and child welfare agencies before plaintiffs 
can meet their burden to establish systemic deficiencies in program administra-
tion. Government officials can degrade the quality of the plaintiffs’ case by ob-
structing discovery, and they can delay the moment of adjudication, when rep-
resentation reinforcement happens, with a strategy of delay. The very political 
discreteness of the group seeking injunctive relief may make this strategy all 
the more attractive to an official currying support from constituents. 
As discussed, an early, firm trial date, made credible by extensive case 
management, can respond to this strategy. The substantive law that judges can 
employ to ensure the humane administration of government programs through 
judicial review loses value unless a procedural pathway to high-quality merits 
adjudication exists. Trial can open this pathway and, as such, functions as a 
procedural enabler of representation reinforcement. 
Of course, not everyone agrees with this pro-democratic understanding of 
structural reform litigation.199 Even a representation-reinforcement skeptic, 
however, should prefer trial as the best possible way to resolve these cases. A 
trial forces the judge into view, where public scrutiny can hold him accounta-
ble. As Judith Resnik has argued, quoting Jeremy Benthem, “[p]ublicity is the 
very soul of justice. . . . It keeps the judge himself, while trying, under trial.”200 
Also, a trial will likely produce a published set of findings,201 whereas negotiat-
                                                        
198  See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 171, at 6–8. For a defense of representation reinforcement 
through judicial review as pro-democratic, see Ilya Somin, Democracy and Judicial Review 
Revisited, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 287, 291–93 (2004); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 88 (1980) (asserting that “a representation-
reinforcing approach to judicial review . . . is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary . . . 
entirely supportive of, the underlying premises of the American system of representative 
democracy”). 
199  See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT 
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 8 (2003). 
200  Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of 
Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 530 (2006) (quoting JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 355 (Edinburgh, William Tait 1843)); see also 
Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 
5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 2, 24–26 (2011). 
201  Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, 
and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 165 
(2006) (“Judgment as a matter of law, bench trials, and the like are the grist of the opinion 
mill.”). 
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ed consent decrees often remain inaccessible except to the unusually intrepid 
researcher.202 Structural reform after trial happens in the open, in other words, 
lessening whatever democratic affront judicial review might pose. 
2. Accountability Benefits 
Trials in structural reform cases provide unique moments of accountability 
and, in this way, engage the public without juror empowerment. They can force 
those responsible for the allegedly deficient program to explain their choices 
for its administration in public, as part of a conversation disciplined by eviden-
tiary rules and procedural practices that require honesty and completeness. In 
non-legal settings, the official cannot be compelled to explain himself and can 
avoid questions that displease him. At trial, the official’s arguments, justifica-
tions, and evasions do not disappear into an obscure deposition transcript, and 
the official cannot use the luxury of an affidavit, written in advance, to equivo-
cate.203 He has to answer hard questions. 
Arpaio’s testimony in a racial profiling case brought against his office il-
lustrates how the disciplined nature of conversation at trial can produce this sort 
of accountability. He had made a number of incendiary statements in other set-
tings, including claims in his co-authored book that Mexican immigrants “are 
separate from the American mainstream,”204 and that “[a]ll other immigrants, 
exclusive of those from Mexico, hold to certain hopes and truths” about the 
American dream.205 During a television interview with Glenn Beck, when 
asked how he can enforce immigration law, Arpaio said, “what they look like, 
if they just look like they came from another country, we can take care of that 
situation.”206 When class counsel grilled Arpaio on these statements at trial, he 
dissembled and unconvincingly disavowed them.207 At the end of the examina-
tion, the lawyer got Arpaio to declare that he had misrepresented his beliefs to 
the public on television and in print.208 
                                                        
202  See generally Margo Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and How We Should 
End the Practical Obscurity of Injunctions and Consent Decrees, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 515 
(2010). 
203  The refusal of witnesses to testify in favor of Prop 8, California’s constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting same-sex marriage, is illuminating in this respect. After rendering opinions 
in depositions and expert reports, most of these witnesses refused to testify at trial. Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 954–55 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
204  Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable G. Murray Snow (Bench Tri-
al Day 2, at 278–537) at 352, Melendres v. Arpaio, No. 2:07-cv-02513-GMS (D. Ariz. July 
24, 2012). 
205  Id. at 348. 
206  Id. at 364. 
207  Arpaio blamed the incendiary statements in his autobiography, for example, on his co-
author. Id. at 349. 
208  The lawyer and Arpaio had the following colloquy: 
Q: Which is the truth, Sheriff: what you’re saying here in court or what you said in your book? 
A: The truth is what I say in court, to the best of my recollection. 
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A trial can also produce and organize information about the administration 
of government programs and create accountability in this manner. Based in part 
on evidence the Graves v. Arpaio plaintiffs presented at trial, the NCCHC 
withdrew Maricopa County’s accreditation. Presumably the information neces-
sary to make this judgment existed in deposition testimony and in documents 
exchanged in discovery. In this form, however, the information was scattered 
and not at the public’s disposal. At trial, the plaintiffs’ lawyers not only had to 
publicize this information, they also had to organize it in a manner to help the 
finder of fact measure the jails’ compliance with minimum standards of ade-
quacy. Interested observers, like the NCCHC, could more readily learn from 
the information packaged thusly. Other actors, such as investigative journalists, 
can unearth and organize the sort of information that the plaintiffs’ lawyers as-
sembled for the Graves v. Arpaio trial. But litigators have tools, such as the 
discovery rules and subpoena power, that others lack, and trial, with testimony 
under oath and cross-examination, may vest this information with a particular 
endowment of credibility. 
3. Civic Engagement Benefits 
Trials in structural reform cases can galvanize civic engagement, even if 
citizen-jurors do not actually make legal decisions. During any trial, “a citizen,” 
whether a party or a witness, “can effectively tell his own story publicly in a 
forum of power.”209 This storytelling is all the more significant in structural re-
form litigation, since it often involves issues of high political and policy sali-
ence. What’s more, this storytelling happens under speech conditions that guar-
antee equality of treatment. An inmate or a child in foster care shares the stage 
equally with government officials. While plenty of governmental processes 
may place all participants on formally equal footing, the trial does a better job 
than most at actually valuing all voices equally.210 
Trials in structural reform cases can also catalyze political participation, 
again, due to the significant salience of the issues ventilated in them. A wide 
range of community groups organized “pack the court” campaigns during trial 
in the New York City stop-and-frisk litigation to engage communities affected 
                                                                                                                                
Q: Which is the truth, Sheriff, what you say here in court today or what you tell interviewers like 
. . . Glenn Beck on national television? 
A: Sometimes when you’re talking to national television it’s much different than testifying, 
where you’re going back and forth very quickly, and sometimes . . . the media edits or twists 
things around. 
Q: . . . Is what you’re saying here in court true or is what you told . . . Glenn Beck true? 
A: To the best of my recollection, I’m testifying to what I remember here in court. 
Id. at 477–78. 
209  BURNS, supra note 11, at 113. 
210  Id. at 133 (describing procedural justice literature). 
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by police practices in efforts to reform them.211 After each day during the trial’s 
first week, organizations led marches and rallies, often departing from the 
courthouse steps.212 Advocates likewise used the trial in the Arpaio racial pro-
filing case as a springboard for community organizing and political action.213 
During and for several months after the trial, for example, Latino groups regis-
tered thousands of new voters in Maricopa County.214 It is hard to imagine ad-
vocates using other moments in litigation, such as document review or deposi-
tions, to prompt such public action. Perhaps trial succeeds as a galvanizing 
mechanism because non-lawyers have an intuitive understanding of the pro-
cess’s significance, and because its openness enables access to political actors. 
C. Expanding Opportunities for Trial-Type Proceedings 
An elaborate normative metric is required to measure the democratic value 
of structural reform trials against the benefits that can flow from juror engage-
ment in small-scale cases. But this comparison may be academic if the civil tri-
al rate in ordinary litigation will remain depressed, reform proposals like Prof. 
Subrin’s notwithstanding. In contrast, trials and trial-type proceedings in struc-
tural reform litigation remain distinct procedural possibilities. My impression-
istic sense is that this litigation produces trials at a rate higher than that which 
commentators commonly assert about complex litigation.215 In July 2013, trial 
ended in the New York stop-and-frisk case.216 Trial in the racial profiling case 
against Arpaio’s office concluded in August 2012.217 A plaintiff class of about 
8,500 children, challenging the constitutional adequacy of Massachusetts’ fos-
                                                        
211  E.g., First Week of Floyd Stop-and-Frisk Trial Concludes, COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR 
POLICE REFORM (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.changethenypd.org/news/first-week-floyd-stop 
-and-frisk-trial-concludes. 
212  Id. 
213  Ted Robbins, Ariz. Activists Rally for Votes Against Sheriff Arpaio, NPR (Aug. 2,  
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/02/157761433/ariz-activists-rally-for-votes-against-sher 
iff-arpaio; see also Tim Gaynor, Hundreds in Phoenix March Against Arizona Immigration 
Law, REUTERS NEWS (July 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/28 
/us-usa-arizona-immigration-protest-idUSBRE86R0SJ20120728. 
214  See Best of the Press: 11,054, ADIOS ARPAIO (Aug. 1, 2012), 
http://www.adiosarpaio.com/2012/08/best-of-the-press-11054/. 
215  E.g., Craig Green, Black-and-White Judging in a World of Grays, 46 TULSA L. REV. 391, 
403 (2011) (“Even more than other lawsuits (which is saying something), class actions al-
most never reach trial . . . .”). But see Gene Mesh, Handling a Mass Disaster as a Class Ac-
tion, 27 AM. JUR. TRIALS 485, § 105 (“[F]ew class actions for damages, as distinguished from 
civil rights class suits for injunctive relief, ever reach the trial stage . . . .”). 
216  E.g., Joseph Goldstein, Judge Criticizes ‘High Error Rate’ of New York Police Stops, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2013, at A20. On the likely size of the plaintiff class, see Floyd v. New 
York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
217  Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013); William Hermann,  
Arizona Sheriff Arpaio’s Racial Profiling Trial Ends, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 3, 2012  
9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-02/arizona-sheriff-s-civil 
-rights-trial-draws-to-close. 
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ter care system, rested in May 2013 after presenting its case-in-chief at trial.218 
Another trial, involving a 900,000-member class, began in March 2013, to de-
termine whether New York City had planned sufficiently to protect people with 
disabilities in the event of a disaster.219 The challenge to overcrowded condi-
tions in California’s prisons went to trial,220 as did an enormous disability rights 
case in Milwaukee.221 In March 2014, trial ended in a case challenging the le-
gality of Michigan’s same-sex marriage ban.222 
The fact remains that structural reform trials are and always will be rare. 
But these cases provide “vivid” litigation episodes, with more public signifi-
cance than their numbers alone might suggest.223 Trial in even one of them 
might yield democratic benefits commensurate with those that a score of small-
scale jury trials can produce. The Arpaio racial profiling trial may not have in-
volved jurors in decision-making, but it helped catalyze efforts to register thou-
sands of new Latino voters. 
Finally, a modest change to judicial practice can generate the functional 
equivalent of trial in a lot of structural reform cases. This is so because, increas-
ingly, merits adjudication occurs at the class certification stage when plaintiffs 
seek injunctive relief for systemic harm. 
Many, if not most, structural reform cases proceed as class actions.224 Be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes in June 
2011, class certification motions in these cases succeeded as a matter of course 
                                                        
218  E.g., Milton J. Valencia, Judge Hears Case over Mass. Foster Care System, BOS. GLOBE 
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/23/former-foster-child-tells 
-federal-court-she-was-neglected-and-over-prescribed-drugs-state-
system/MK5iTKfhw46b9pYQRWI4FN/story.html. On the size of the plaintiff class, see 
Vigurs ex rel. Connor B. v. Patrick, 272 F.R.D. 288, 292 (D. Mass. 2011). 
219  E.g., Cindy Rodriguez, City’s Treatment of Disabled During Disasters to be Scrutinized 
During Trial in Class Action Lawsuit, WNYC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/274693-citys-treatment-disabled-during-disasters-be-scrutinized 
-during-trial-class-action-lawsuit/. 
220  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1910, 1928 (2011). For examples of prison conditions 
cases going to trial in the years 2012 and 2013, see Ball v. LeBlanc, 988 F. Supp. 2d 639 
(M.D. La. 2013); Prison Legal News v. Colum. Cnty., 942 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Or. 2013); 
Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:08-cv-01317, 
2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012); Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Weber, 897 
F. Supp. 2d 828 (D.S.D. 2012). 
221  Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 481, 488 (7th Cir. 2012). For examples 
of other disability rights cases going to trial during the last three years, see Chester Upland 
Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania, 284 F.R.D. 305 (E.D. Pa. 2012); CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 888 F. 
Supp. 2d 534 (M.D. Pa. 2012); C.K. ex rel. R.P.-K. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 10-00436, 2012 
WL 1082250 (D. Haw. Mar. 30, 2012); see also DL v. District of Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 
1 (D.D.C. 2011). 
222  Erik Eckholm, In Gay Marriage Suit, a Battle over Research, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/us/in-gay-marriage-suit-a-battle-over-research.html. 
223  Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 
511 (1986). 
224  David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming2015) 
(SSRN draft at 6–8). 
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and required little more than a perfunctory opinion from the judge.225 Courts 
imposed minimal evidentiary obligations on plaintiffs to prove that their claims 
met the requirements for certification in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules.226 Wal-
Mart, however, announced a more stringent standard for Rule 23(a)(2)’s com-
monality requirement. Class certification now requires a “common contention 
. . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means 
that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to 
the validity of each one of the [class member’s] claims in one stroke.”227 Also, 
plaintiffs after Wal-Mart bear the evidentiary burden to show that this “com-
mon contention” exists with “significant proof.”228 
When plaintiffs attack the administration of a government program, ser-
vice, or institution, as opposed to the facial legality of some stated policy, the 
plaintiffs’ common question often asks whether there exists a systemic practice 
or custom of illegal behavior that has caused harm to class members. Defend-
ants often deny that this question is relevant to class members’ claims, insisting 
that any injuries suffered by class members resulted from idiosyncratic, indi-
vidualized causes.229 Put differently, defendants deny that a custom or practice 
responsible for class members’ harm exists. To resolve the dispute and deter-
mine whether the proposed class meets the commonality requirement, the court 
must resolve the central merits question for the plaintiffs’ case: does the de-
fendant indeed have an unlawful custom or practice that causes harm to all 
                                                        
225  The Wal-Mart court tightened up the standards for Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality provi-
sion and Rule 23(b)(2). Before Wal-Mart, courts routinely declared that each requirement is 
all-but-automatically satisfied in structural reform cases seeking injunctive relief. See, e.g., 
Kanter ex rel. Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994) ((b)(2)); S.S. ex rel. D.S. v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 255 F.R.D. 59, 73 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ((b)(2)); Kerrigan v. Phila. Bd. of 
Election, 248 F.R.D. 470, 474 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Bzdawka v. Milwaukee Cnty., 238 F.R.D. 
469, 476 (E.D. Wis. 2006) ((b)(2)); Does I–III v. District of Columbia, 232 F.R.D. 18, 26–29 
(D.D.C. 2005) (commonality); Nicholson v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(commonality); Forbes ex rel. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
((b)(2)); Carter ex rel. Caroline C. v. Johnson, 174 F.R.D. 452, 467 (D. Neb. 1996) ((b)(2)). 
226  E.g., Willits v. Los Angeles, No. CV 10-05782, 2011 WL 7767305, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 
3, 2011); Shakhnes ex rel. Shakhnes v. Eggleston, 740 F. Supp. 2d 602, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); Staley v. Wilson Cnty., No. 3:04-1127, 2006 WL 2401083, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 
18, 2006); LV v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 9917, 2005 WL 2298173, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005); Raymond v. Rowland, 220 F.R.D. 173, 179 (D. Conn. 2004). 
227  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
228  Id. at 2553; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 
2008) (providing a “preponderance of the evidence” standard). Cf. George Rutherglen, The 
Way Forward After Wal-Mart, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 871, 882–83 (2012) (commenting on 
the proper evidentiary standard). 
229  E.g., Mothersell v. Syracuse, 289 F.R.D. 389, 395–96 (N.D.N.Y. 2013); Parsons v. Ryan, 
289 F.R.D. 513, 520 (D. Ariz. 2013); Lane v. Kitzhaber, 283 F.R.D. 587, 597–98 (D. Or. 
2012); Gray v. Golden Gate Nat’l Recreational Area, 279 F.R.D. 501, 510 (N.D. Cal. 2011); 
Buchanan ex rel. N.B. v. Hamos, No. 11 C 6866, 2012 WL 1953146, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 
30, 2012). 
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class members?230 Moreover, it must do so based on evidence, not the plead-
ings, because of the “significant proof” obligation Wal-Mart set. 
Courts now have a reason—perhaps an obligation—to conduct the equiva-
lent of a bench trial at the class certification stage in structural reform litigation. 
A Texas district judge did so in a sizeable foster care reform case after the Fifth 
Circuit vacated her class certification order for failing to make commonality 
findings “with requisite proof.”231 On remand, the judge held a three-day evi-
dentiary hearing, during which she heard testimony from seventeen witness-
es232 and received sixty-two exhibits into evidence.233 She then re-certified the 
class. As for commonality, the judge was “persuaded” that the Texas system 
suffered from systemic deficiencies that put children at the risk of harm, a con-
clusion supported by six pages of evidentiary findings.234 Another district judge 
relied on trial findings when he re-certified a class of children with disabilities 
after the D.C. Circuit vacated an earlier order.235 
Most structural reform cases will not proceed to trial. But many will in-
clude a class certification stage. Some judges, even after Wal-Mart, decide 
class certification motions on the papers, or at most after a couple of hours of 
oral argument.236 If a district judge wants a class certification to withstand ap-
pellate scrutiny, she should hold the equivalent of a bench trial to gather the 
necessary evidence. Findings based on live witness testimony will more likely 
                                                        
230  E.g., Mothersell, 289 F.R.D. at 396; Parsons, 289 F.R.D. at 521; Ligon v. City of New 
York, 288 F.R.D. 72, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Strickland ex rel. D.G. v. Yarbrough, 278 F.R.D. 
635, 639 (N.D. Okla. 2011); Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07 Civ. 
8224, 2012 WL 1344417, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2012). 
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232  Minute Entry for Jan. 22, 2013, Proceedings at 1–2 Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832 (No. 2:11-
cv-00084); Minute Entry for Jan. 23, 2013, Proceedings at 1–3 Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832 
(No. 2:11-cv-00084); Minute Entry for Jan. 24, 2013, Proceedings at 1–2 Stukenberg, 675 
F.3d 832 (No. 2:11-cv-00084). 
233  Decl. of Christina Wilson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Mo-
tion for Class Certification at 1, Exs. 1–31 Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832 (No. 2:11-cv-00084); 
Decl. of Adriana T. Luciano in Support of Plaintiffs’ Post-Hearing Brief in Support of Mo-
tion for Class Certification at 1, Exs. 1–31 Stukenberg, 675 F.3d 832 (No. 2:11-cv-00084). 
234  M.D. v. Perry, 294 F.R.D. 7, 38–44 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
235  D.L. v. District of Columbia, 845 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Class Certification and Reinstatement of Findings of Liability and Order Grant-
ing Relief at Ex. 1 D.L., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 1:05-cv-01437) (indicating evidence the 
plaintiffs relied upon in support of their class certification motion). 
236  Parsons v. Ryan, another prison conditions case assigned to Judge Wake, is illustrative. 
Judge Wake certified an inmate class in March 2013. He reviewed an extensive paper record 
of evidence to determine if a common question sufficient for Rule 23(b)(2) purposes existed. 
Agreeing that the plaintiffs met the standard, he concluded that “probative evidence . . . tips 
the balance in favor of concluding that the problems identified in the provision of health care 
are not merely isolated instances but, rather, examples of systemic deficiencies . . . .” Par-
sons v. Ryan, 289 F.R.D. 513, 521 (D. Ariz. 2013). Although the finding does not preclude a 
different conclusion after trial, Judge Wake effectively decided the key issue of the defend-
ant’s liability, sufficient to support the issuance of injunctive relief. But he did so after an 
afternoon of oral argument, not after anything that approximated the thirteen days of trial he 
held in Graves v. Arpaio. 
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receive deference from an appellate court than findings based on filings 
alone.237 Beyond their strategic value, trial-type proceedings at the class certifi-
cation stage can generate a lot of the democratic benefits I have identified, in a 
large number of structural reform cases. This boost requires nothing more than 
a change in judicial practice, not even a modest rule reform, to happen. 
CONCLUSION 
My turn to structural reform litigation differs from Prof. Subrin’s emphasis 
on the small-scale private law case as the repository for civil procedure’s de-
mocratizing potential in the wake of the civil trial’s demise. While we go in dif-
ferent directions, I am convinced by his insistence on a particular point of de-
parture. For decades, Prof. Subrin has insisted that civil procedure do more than 
facilitate dispute resolution efficiently, that the proper procedural regulation of 
civil litigation can create important benefits for American democracy. This 
must be so. 
                                                        
237  E.g., Bertucci Contracting Corp. v. M/V Antwerpen, 465 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir. 2006). 
